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VIGNETTES OF THE CRIMINAL COURT'
CHARLES C. ARADO
2
Perjury in a Divorce Case
Here was one of the few perjury charges reaching the Criminal
Court trial stage. The indictment charged the defendant with hav-
ing made false statements under oath in a divorce suit. The presid-
ing judge in the divorce case was endeavoring to make an example
of the defendant, considering his testimony a flagrant violation of
the statute. The defense attorney would ask a prospective juror,
"You believe that every man is entitled to a fair and impartial
trial? You wouldn't convict the defendant unless he were proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?" The juror naturally agreed
with him.
The examination would continue along this line: "False swear-
ing is not perjury in Illinois. To be guilty of perjury, a man must
have violated the perjury statute with all the elements of that
offense." The defense attorney was well-acquainted with the dis-
tinction between "false swearing" and "perjury."
In the course of his questioning, he said, "They try and deter-
mine about a hundred divorce cases a day in the courts of this
county!"
On another occasion he said, "Is this the first time that you
have been called upon to be a judge? Well, we will let you act as
judge in this case.
"Would your answers be the same except as to the questions
that applied personally to the other jurors?
"Do you have any objection to the principle of divorce, or a
prejudice against people who have been divorced?
"Do you have any preconceived notion of what the decision in
this case ought to be?
"When you take your seat as a juror, you do not lose your
common sense. The law expects you to use it in deciding the issues."
Although the judge in the divorce case appeared as a prose-
cuting witness, the court was forced to take the case from the jury
upon a failure of proof of the elements of the charge.
1 The last two installments in this series have been published in numbers 3 and
4 of this volume.
2 Member of the Chicago Bar.
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Good Reputation in Robbery Trial
An erstwhile actor, caught by a grocer while running from his
store after a robbery, was now facing a jury. The accused was
intoxicated at the time. His youthful wife, stylishly dressed, ap-
peared at the defense side of the table. The defendant's associate
in the robbery shouldered the entire blame. The defense contended
that the accused did not know what was going on and his previous
good reputation showed he could not have been in his right mind
to commit such a cheap holdup. It was also pointed out that the
defendant's twenty-five years in the show business entitled him to
receive aid from the Equity Association of which he was a member.
Counsel did hot ask for an acquittal in the course of his final
argument, but did say, "What is the use of spending millions of
dollars for this new courthouse if it is not spent in the name of
justice?"
The jury promptly convicted the co-defendant but disagreed as
to the actor. Thereupon the judge reduced the bond from ten to
two thousand dollars. A few weeks later the State nolle prossed
the charge.
Back-Seat Driver Blamed for Death
Defense counsel accepted the first twelve jurors who stepped
into the box. A woman had been struck and killed by an automo-
bile driven by the defendant, nineteen years old. His employer was
in the car at the time. The latter was indicted with the boy but
obtained a separate trial upon a motion for a severance. The acci-
dent occurred on the left side of the street, in fact, along the left
curb. Another feature of the case indicating criminal recklessness
was the fact that the defendant drove on until forced against the
curb by a pursuing driver. No trace of whiskey or other intoxicating
beverage was observed about the boy, although the employer's
breath indicated that he had been drinking. The latter was present
during the trial but did not take the stand. The boy testified that
the accident occurred in the wee hours of the morning, that his boss
had been drinking throughout the evening; and that both were
tired and anxious to reach home. His boss had directed him "to
step on it." Urged again and again to go faster, it was while driv-
ing in this fashion, that the accident occurred. Defense counsel
argued that the boss should be on trial. He was the real cause
of the accident. There were no eye-witnesses. The jury accepted
the boy's version of an unavoidable accident and acquitted. The
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trial, including the selection of the jury, hearing of the evidence,
arguments, and instructions was completed during the day.
Shooting Troublesome Boys
The defendant, a woman forty-five years of age and neatly
attired, was replying briskly to questions propounded by her attor-
ney. The latter was seeking to bring out points not permissible
under the rules of criminal evidence. From the testimony, it ap-
peared that she and her husband were the owners of a sixteen-
apartment building in which they lived, located in the neighborhood
of a group of young boys known as "Gang No. 33." The accused
testified that on numerous occasions she had trouble with them.
Several times they entered the basement of her building to commit
mischief. They had often entered the vestibule and written upon
the walls of the hallway. Her son had been kidnapped by them. The
judge made it clear that unless the jury found that the deceased
boy was identified with these acts they should have no bearing on
the issue. If he were identified as one of the gang, however, who
had created trouble before, the judge instructed the witness that
she might tell the jury about these acts because they tended to
explain the subsequent homicide.
The locale of the tragedy was the basement of her home. She
had heard the boys talking. Picking up a loaded gun behind a clock
on the dresser in her room. she surprised them. They fled out the
rear door. She was highly excited and fired the first shot into the
ceiling to scare them. With no intention to kill the deceased, she
was horrified upon finding that one of the bullets had entered his
body. He lay mortally wounded at the entrance into the basement.
On previous occasions, members of the gang, including the deceased
boy, had threatened her life. On the day in question. as she came
down the stairs, they called her insulting names. She felt at that
moment that they might make an attack upon her. On the theory,
then, of self-defense, coupled with a denial of any intention to
kill, she submitted her fate to the jury. While self-defense was
difficult to establish, her claim that she had not intended to kill
the boy and had shot solely for the purpose of frightening him away
was at least a plausible explanation. The fact that she had borne
an excellent reputation would cause the jury to attach considerable
weight to her story.
Several of the boys in the neighborhood denied the testimony
of the defendant that the deceased had caused annoyance on pre-
vious occasions. They denied, also, that the deceased or they were
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members of "Gang No. 33" or any other gang. The defendant had
conveyed the idea that other property owners in the neighborhood,
who had been victims of the gang, would not testify because of their
fear of consequences.
The State's attorney laid stress upon the argument that it was
not necessary for her to use a gun to chase away playful boys. The
defendant had no right to use a gun for this purpose and its employ-
ment invested the act with malice, making the user legally respon-
sible for its consequences in spite of her contention of a lack of
intent to kill. A jury will consider very solicitiously, however, the
case of an accused who it is reasonably certain, will not be a menace
in the future. Here, the defendant was not a criminal. Jurors weigh
the question of responsibility with a view of protecting society, but
will not go out of their way to doom the accused. If the scales are
evenly balanced, the jury will frequently consider the question
whether society will be safe with the defendant in its midst. As
they decide this question, they will render judgment. In this case
they acquitted.
A Nephew Charged with Slaying His Uncle
A negro about eighteen years old was charged with killing
his uncle. In the State's attorney's cross-examination of the pris-
oner, he asked, "How tall was the deceased?" Answer: "Six feet,
one inch."
"How heavy a man was he?" Answer: "195 pounds."
Since the accused was maintaining that the shooting was in
self-defense as the uncle approached the boy with a butcher knife,
the height and weight of the.alleged assailant materially assisted
the defense. The accused was about five feet in height, weighing
only 110 pounds.
"What were you doing before five o'clock on that day?" De-
fense counsel objected, saying, "That is not proper cross-examina-
tion." The objection was sustained.
The State's attorney's next question was, "Where did your
uncle get the knife?" The defending attorney again objected, claim-
ing that the prosecutor had to confine himself to matters brought
out in direct-examination. The objection was again sustained.
A well-dressed grey-haired negress then took the stand for
the defense to testify that the accused had borrowed fifty cents from
her on the day of the slaying, thus corroborating a phase of the
defendant's story. She also testified as to his reputation for peace-
fulness and quietude.
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The defendant had surrendered to the police upon his attorney's
advice, the latter going to the station with him and doing the talking
for him. After the accused was jolaced in the hands of a sheriff, the
attorney was satisfied he would not be questioned further. Since
there is always a definite cause underlying a slaying, a full account
of the tragedy is immediately requested by the police. Unless this
story is repeated at the trial, officers will be called to contradict the
accused.
The defendant testified that his uncle had hurled the vilest
epithet in the language at him and shouted, "I'm going to kill you."
This threat provoked the fatal attack.
At one time during his direct-examination of the accused, the
defense attorney said, "I promise to connect that matter by other
testimony."
On another occasion he asked, "Will your honor please rule
upon that point so that I may preserve an exception?"
The defendant didn't remember how many shots were fired.
This foreclosed much cross-examination as to details surrounding
the homicide.
Strangely, the wife of the uncle sided with the accused. Counsel
asked her, "Did your husband drink?" An objection to the question
was sustained, but the inference was plain.
He then asked, "Did your husband ever talk to you about this
boy?" An objection was also made to this question. The defending
attorney was about to explain why the inquiry was admissible.
When the judge indicated he would order the jury withdrawn, the
attorney said, "Oh, I don't want to lose the court's time. I'll preserve
my exception and go ahead." The impression given was that the
attorney was so confident of the ultimate result that he was willing
to waive a legal right to conserve the time of the court and jury.
Testifying that she had been working for the same employer
for fifteen years, the impression was given that she had supported
her husband during this period. Along with the plain inference that
he was a heavy drinker, the jury was led to believe there was not
much loss in the slaying. The defense attorney wisely reserved this
testimony till the end of his examination in chief. The widow may
have reasoned nothing was to be gained by sending a boy to the
penitentiary on account of an attack upon her worthless husband
which incidentally proved fatal. There was a quick verdict of not
guilty.
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Alleged Confessions Met by Alibis
The scene of this homicide was a south side saloon. The State
charged the three defendants with killing the victim during a
hold-up and further claimed that the defendants had confessed. The
accused were also identified by three witnesses. The defense pro-
ceeded upon the theory that the confessions were forced and that
the three identifying witnesses were mistaken. Each defendant
presented several alibi witnesses.
Two of the defendants were arrested shortly after the offense.
Implicating their confederate, he was arrested soon afterwards.
When a policeman testified about a confession, one of the defending
attorneys who had been in the prosecutor's office for a number of
years and had become well versed in third degree technique, was
assigned the role of cross-examiner.
He developed a picture wherein there were several police-
men in a small room with the defendants. The inference was
raised, "Why was it necessary to have police officers interviewing
these boys? What were the assistant State's attorneys being
paid for?"
A prosecutor who had recently left the office assured defense
counsel that if he were called as a witness by the assistant State's
attorney handling this trial to substantiate the confessions, he would
reveal the physical condition of the boys at that time. He wasn't
called.
The verdict hinged upon the confessions. They had to be ex-
plained away for the defense to prevail. With the definite knowl-
edge of brutality imparted to him by the former prosecutor, the
cross-examiner felt confident of his ability to break down the
testimony of these police officers.
During the presentation of the defense, one of the boys testified
that he went to church on the Sunday morning of the homicide.
The prosecutor asked, "What church?" When the defendant an-
swered, "Saint Mary's," the five Irish jurors smiled.
One of the defendant's hands had been badly injured in early
childhood. None of the identifying witnesses, however, had noticed
it during the robbery. Once again, a disfigurement was being relied
upon to help an accused gain his freedom.
In final argument the first speaker for the defense started out
in this vein, "You have the distinction of sitting as jurors in a court-
room presided over by a judge who recently was sitting in a review-
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ing court. Certainly he would not permit me to misquote the
law, even if I dared do it.
"Our constitution is the supreme law of the land. The 8th
Article of the Bill of Rights declares, 'No citizen shall be forced to
give evidence against himself.' Now this section was being violated
so many times by the Chicago police that the legislators, in their
wisdom, saw fit to pass a special act making it a criminal offense
to extract a confession by third-degree methods."
The jury elected to discredit the police officers, giving the three
defendants their liberty.
An Attack Upon a Police Officer While on the Stand
A colored man, forty years of age, was charged with the slaying
of a policeman while in plain clothes. With nerves on edge during
the testimony of one of the officers, his eyes glared in anger. Sud-
denly lie arose and dashed toward the witness. This outbreak,
though perhaps justified by the twists being given his alleged con-
fession, augured ill for him. Twelve white men were about to pass
judgment upon him. The jury might believe that he had murder
in his heart when it came to policemen and could not resist shooting
them if the opportunity presented itself.
The State's case was based upon a theory that the defendant
and his companion were holding up a victim when a squad car
happened to pass by. Two of the officers ran toward them to make
the arrest. In the scuffle, shots were fired. One of the policemen
fell mortally wounded. His companion pursued the defendant and
finally arrested him. The opposing version was that the defendant's
companion drew a gun on an acquaintance they had met and he (the
accused) foolishly ran away. The fact that he had lately been dis-
charged from the Joliet penitentiary militated against this theory.
In the course of a discussion prompted by the effort to intro-
duce this confession, the judge said, "I will permit a separate hear-
ing on the admissibility of a confession only when a defendant either
claims he was brutally compelled to confess, or where he was led
to believe that it would help him by making it. In either of these
events, it must be claimed that the prosecuting authorities acted
unlawfully.
The judge seemed inclined to place considerable credence upon
the defendant's three claims, that he was unconscious at the time
the confession was prepared; that he never signed it; and that the
confession had never been read to him. Yet the court did not
believe these contentions necessitated a separate hearing. While he
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felt that they were proper inquiries for cross-examination upon
the question of the credibility of the alleged confession, the State
could introduce it without a separate hearing. The court permitted
the defense to cross-examine the policemen at length, to show the
defendant's unconsciousness shortly after his arrest, the paralytic
condition of his left side, the fact that the accused was committed
to a hospital, the nature of his wounds, and his denials that the
statement had been read to him or signed.
Defense counsel asked the arresting officer how he happened
to remember the warning given the accused that his statements
might be used against him. He also asked whether he had made a
memorandum of, the investigation; whether the alleged statement
was a narrative upon the part of the accused or the result of de-
tailed questioning; and whether the officer wrote up the examina-
tion immediately thereafter.
Feeling there would be a death verdict and sentence, followed
by a writ of error in the Supreme Court, the judge stated for the
benefit of the court reporters, "In a case of this character, the
defendant should have considerable latitude in cross-examining
police officers."
The accused was found guilty and sentenced to death.
Facing the Electric Chair
Three young men were charged with the murder of a store-
keeper during the commission of a holdup. Two of the defendants
under the indictment elected to plead guilty with an assurance
that they would receive a sentence of life imprisonment. Zander,
however, couldn't see it that way. A soldier with an excellent over-
seas record, he was determined to plead not guilty. The impression
was given during the selection of the jury, that his case was hope-
less. The prosecutor piled up his evidence and followed this with an
impressive closing argument. The jury returned a verdict of death
within twenty minutes. An effort was then made to have the court
permit the accused to accept the same punishment which was to be
meted out to his associates. The American Legion delegated two
attorneys to sponsor his cause. In arguing their motion for a new
trial, one of them spoke of the effect of shell fire upon the mind.
Claiming that the accused was psychopathic, an invert personality,
the attorney maintained, "While he had the courage to go to the jury
on a plea of not guilty, he used poor judgment, to be expected from
such a type." Finally, the judge interposed. "Zander, what have you
to say for yourself?" The prisoner answered in a low. almost whis-
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pering tone, "I would rather have life than the chair." The judge
asked, "When did you change your mind?" After a few pleasantries,
the judge granted the motion.
The defendant had taken the stand during the trial and testified
that he had been working for a man by the name of Loren at the
time of the holdup. The State's attorney asked him questions con-
cerning the whereabouts of this employer. One of the officers in-
vestigated and discovered that Zander hadn't worked there within
six years of the date of the offense.
Zander had been the only witness in his own behalf. He testified
that he had attended a party given for one of his co-defendants. He
and his two associates left the scene for half an hour and later re-
turned. The inference was that the holdup took place in that interval.
The jury naturally expected the two co-defendants to support this
account. When they didn't testify, his doom was sealed.
Brawl or Holdup?
Nine boys of Polish extraction were charged with murder.
The victim of the assault was walking home with two friends when
they passed this group of boys whose ages ranged from sixteen to
twenty-three. The State contended that the defendants made the
attack in the course of a robbery, that the victim was knocked down
and suffered a skull fracture which occasioned death. The defense,
on the other hand, maintained that the affair was a street brawl in
which the victim fell and accidentally suffered a fatal injury.
The State's theory of robbery was confirmed by the victim's
watch being found upon one of the defendants and the written
statements obtained from all the boys immediately after their arrest.
Before the coroner, the defendants denied the truth of their state-
ments claiming that they had been beaten by the police officers.
Twenty-five policemen took the stand and denied the attack.
Although the prosecutors had qualified the jurors for the death
penalty, in final argument, they did not ask them to impose it. This
exhibition of fair play was designed to bring about a compromised
verdict entailing imprisonment for murder, or at least manslaughter,
calling for a penalty of one year to life.
In his final address, an attorney for the defense attacked, firstly,
the competency of the statements as a matter of law, and secondly,
their credibility, even though they constituted valid evidence.
Nine defendants were being charged with murder, although
the slaying was committed by a single offender. It was contended
that each of the boys conspired, aided, or encouraged the consum-
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mation of the robbery. When the State had established a conspiracy
to rob, or facts indicating participation in the alleged robbery, each
became responsible for the consequent fatality. Upon the failure
to establish such conspiracy or participation, the State could estab-
lish guilt of murder only against the defendant who had struck the
fatal blow.
The jury found all the defendants guilty of murder and fixed
the penalties at terms of imprisonment from fourteen to thirty years.
Temporary Insanity as a Defense
The defendant was of German extraction, about thirty-five
years of age, living apart from his wife. She had sworn out a peace-
bond warrant to keep him from molesting her. After appearing at
the Police Court in response to this warrant, he went to a hardware
store where he purchased a butcher knife. He proceeded to his
wife's home. Gaining entrance, he made a furious attack upon his
wife and child. He then turned the weapon upon himself. All three
were rushed to a hospital by neighbors. The little girl, about ten
years of age, died. That the accused was insane during this frenzied
attack, was the defense theory. He was without funds, however,
to engage the services of alienists. The testimony of friends and
relatives was that he had loved his daughter dearly.
A singular feature of the trial was the appearance of a sister
of the wife of the accused in the role of a defense witness. She
testified as to the waywardness of her sister, how she had enter-
tained other men.
The prosecution was relying upon a strict interpretation of the
law. A human life had been taken. The defendant killed someone.
The testimony showed that he remembered everything that had
happened up to the moment of the tragedy and after it. The
unwritten law and temporary insanity failing to impress themselves
upon the jurors, they found the defendant guilty of murder and
fixed his penalty at fourteen years. The presiding judge felt that an
injustice had been done and granted the defense motion for a new
trial. The defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter, carrying a
penalty of one year to life.
In explaining his reaction to the evidence the judge stated in
substance, "There was clearly no deliberate intent to kill the
daughter. That idea arose in the heat of passion. The defendant's
attempt to commit suicide showed he was in a frenzy. A homicide
committed under these circumstances is voluntary manslaughter
and not murder."
